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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/746
12 September 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 SEPTEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GUINEA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, at its meeting held at the United Nations, New York, on 11 September 1996, took note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the President of the Security Council, dated 6 September 1996 (S/1996/730), and reviewed the current situation regarding the elections to be held in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 14 September 1996. The OIC Contact Group also reviewed the presence on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina of monitors and observers from OIC countries as well as other independent international observers.

The OIC Contact Group echoes the conclusions of the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the necessary conditions for free and fair elections within certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially within the entity of the Republika Srpska, have not been met. The OIC Contact Group shares its grave concern that the conditions are not even marginal but completely unreceptive to the free expression of the voters' democratic and human rights within the Republika Srpska. These basic human and democratic rights are being trampled on and diversity is not tolerated. What is clearly seen is that the non-Serbian and opposition parties have been and are being prohibited from partaking in the political process in the Serbian entity. Furthermore, the media in this entity has also been firmly under the control of the authorities and has continued to play a negative role. The process of refugee return, as guaranteed by the Dayton/Paris Agreement, is not being allowed to begin. While ordinary citizens are deliberately denied freedom of movement, internationally indicted war criminals continue to be free in defiance of the Dayton/Paris Agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions. What is more disturbing is the fact that the very authorities that are responsible for these abuses are also organizing the elections within the Republika Srpska.

The OIC Contact Group expresses its serious concern about the aforementioned conditions, which are not conducive to holding free, fair and legally valid elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in the Republika Srpska entity.

The OIC Contact Group will, hence, conduct its own evaluation and assessment of the elections to be held in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 14 September 1996 and particularly in the Republika Srpska, based on the reports received from the OIC monitors and observers and those of the independent international monitors and observers as well as media reports on the elections, and shall inform the Security Council of its evaluation. The OIC Contact Group requests that the Security Council undertake an objective and thorough review of the elections, in order to determine whether they were free and fair or not, taking duly into account the evaluation and assessments made by the OIC and other regional organizations, as well as by independent monitors and observers of the elections.

The OIC Contact Group further notes that under Security Council resolution 1022 (1995), sanctions cannot be terminated unless the elections are certified to have been "free and fair".

I would be grateful for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mahawa Bangoura CAMARA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Chairman of the OIC Contact
Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/747
12 September 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 11 SEPTEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CUBA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to write to you in connection with the note dated 29 August 1996 from the President of the Security Council (S/1996/704), which contains the results of the further discussion by the Council of the application of the President's note of 30 July 1996 (S/1996/603) concerning the list of matters of which the Council is seized (rule 11 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council) in the light of the comments made by several members of the Organization to the President of the Council.

The Permanent Mission of Cuba is aware that efforts have been made in recent years to improve the documentation of the Security Council. Cuba commends these efforts in the belief that they can and must contribute to the necessary process of making the Council's decision-making, procedures and methods of work more democratic and transparent.

However, we feel that these measures must in all cases be consistent with the practice reflected in the Council's regular procedures, with the principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations and with the spirit of respect for and observance of the rights and duties recognized by the Charter, both by Member States and by the Security Council, which acts at their behest and on their behalf.

The Permanent Mission of Cuba always believed that a convincing and timely response to questions regarding the procedure set out in the note by the President of the Council contained in document S/1996/603 would contribute to the process of reform in the Council and to the negotiations in progress on this matter, would make this important organ more democratic and transparent and would enhance its credibility. Such a response would also build confidence among Member States and encourage them to continue to delegate to this organ the responsibility for maintaining, on their behalf, international peace and security.

In this connection, the Permanent Mission of Cuba has duly noted the outcome of the further discussion of the application of the President's note, and of paragraphs 2 and 3 in particular. While we consider positive the fact that no item will be "automatically" deleted by the Council from the list of

matters of which it is seized, we would have preferred that the Council had refrained from undertaking an exercise of this nature and that it had continued to act responsibly by consulting in timely fashion with the Member States concerned by those items it might ultimately decide to retain, rather than give this responsibility to the States Members of the Organization.

The discussion of the procedure set out in document S/1996/603 did not, unfortunately, result in the most appropriate decision or the one most desired by many Member States. However, it provides a necessary indication that the Council recognizes its obligations to all Members of the Organization to render its procedures and methods of work transparent.

With regard to the procedure set out in paragraphs 2 (a), (b) and (c) of document S/1996/704, the Permanent Mission of Cuba has the honour to state that the Republic of Cuba is interested in retaining items 7, 8, 15 and 47, indicated in the annex to that document, on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bruno RODRÍGUEZ PARRILLA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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S/1996/748
13 September 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

NOTE VERBALE DATED 12 SEPTEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the following:

The summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration (S/1995/15 of 11 January 1996);

The note by the President of the Security Council contained in document S/1996/704 dated 29 August 1996 entitled "Simplification of the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized (rule 11 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council)"; and

The letter dated 9 August 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, contained in document S/1996/655 dated 14 August 1996. This contains arguments and justifications which coincide with our own official point of view, since the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya wishes that the items set out below be kept on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized, in view of their vital importance:

Item 16. Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (see S/10462)

Item 25. Request by the Libyan Arab Republic and Pakistan for consideration of the serious situation arising from recent developments in the occupied Arab territories (see S/11935/Add.12)

Item 33. Letter dated 19 February 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (see S/15560/Add.8)

Item 34. Letter dated 8 August 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (see S/15560/Add.32 and S/15560/Add.33)

Item 36. Letter dated 22 March 1984 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (see S/16270/Add.12 and S/16270/Add.13)

Item 43. Letter dated 15 April 1986 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (see S/17725/Add.15 and S/17725/Add.16)

Item 47. Letter dated 4 January 1989 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Letter dated 4 January 1989 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (see S/20370 and S/20370/Add.1)

The Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya would be grateful if the Secretary-General would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

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S/1996/749
13 September 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 12 SEPTEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF GHANA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Ghana to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to Security Council resolutions 1054 (1996) and 1070 (1996), has the honour to inform him that the Sudan has no diplomatic representation in Ghana and that the competent Ghanaian authorities have no record of Sudanese Government officials or diplomatic personnel having entered Ghana. The terms of the Security Council resolutions have, however, been noted for appropriate action.

96-24025 (E) 130996

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GENERAL

S/1996 750
13 September 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 13 SEPTEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BURUNDI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In my earlier letters to the President of the Security Council, particularly in my letter of 5 September 1996, I provided a preliminary outline of the general political programme drawn up by the new regime in Burundi with a view to resolving the crisis in the country and strengthening the democratic process.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement by the Government of Burundi announcing the re-establishment of the National Assembly within the legal framework of the transitional institutional system and the resumption of activities by political parties.

On instructions from my Government, I should like to request that the text of this statement be circulated to all members of the Security Council as a document of the United Nations.

(Signed) Nsanze TERENCE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Press release dated 12 September 1996 issued by the Minister of Communication, the Government spokesperson

1. The Council of Ministers held a special meeting on Thursday, 12 September 1996, under the chairmanship of the Head of State, His Excellency Major Pierre Buyoya.

2. On the agenda was an important political question: the draft text of a decree-law on the organization of the transitional institutional system.

The question had already been considered at previous meetings. The members of the Council focused on certain political issues which are being followed closely at the national, subregional and even international levels.

The two specific political issues were: political parties and the National Assembly. These two issues call for political decisions which will advance the higher interests of the Burundian nation.

3. In the Declaration of 25 July 1996 issued by the President of the Republic emphasis is placed on the need for the Burundian people to rally together, and the restoration of peace and security for all is considered to be the top priority.

In carrying out this task, the Government needs the contribution of all Burundians of all ethnic groups.

In carrying out this task, the Government of Burundi needs the support of the international community in general and of its neighbours in particular, who are following social and political developments in our country with great interest.

4. The transitional Government's programme sets out Burundi's political, socio-economic and diplomatic goals in detail. Our neighbouring countries are interested in seeing peace, stability and economic recovery in Burundi, as various subregional consultations show.

5. Consideration of the draft text of the decree-law on the organization of the transitional institutional system was intended to answer certain questions raised by Burundians and the international community.

6. The transitional Government's plan of action is a plan of peace, a plan for rallying together, reconciliation and economic recovery.

7. To implement this programme, and bearing in mind all the political realities of the moment, the various undertakings at the subregional level, and the Government's determination and commitment to work for peace, reconciliation and economic recovery, the Council of Ministers took two major political decisions on Thursday, 12 September 1996:

(a) First decision: The National Assembly is hereby re-established within the legal framework of the transitional institutional system which was considered by the members of the Council today.

(b) Second decision: Political parties and associations are hereby authorized to resume their activities, which shall respect the laws and regulations in force.

8. These two political decisions have been taken. In the days to come a text will give them the force of law. The President of the Republic and the Government will indicate to the re-established institutions ways of helping the people of Burundi find peace.

9. We should like to take this opportunity to inform the national and foreign press that the President of the Republic, His Excellency Major Pierre Buyoya, will hold a press conference this Friday, 13 September 1996, at the Hotel Source du Nil. Members of the diplomatic community in Bujumbura wishing to attend are invited to do so.

The President of the Republic will take this opportunity to provide explanations of a political, diplomatic and socio-economic nature with regard to these decisions by the Government.

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GENERAL

S/1996/751
13 September 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 13 SEPTEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TUNISIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the note dated 30 July 1996 from the President of the Security Council concerning the simplification of the list of matters of which the Council is seized (S/1996/603).

In this connection, I should like to inform you that my Government is opposed to the automatic deletion of matters of which the Council is seized and affirms its commitment to maintaining the principle of prior consultations between the Council and the States concerned.

Accordingly, my Government would like to see the following items from the annex to the President's note of 30 July 1996 (S/1996/603) retained on the list of matters of which the Council is seized: item 39, entitled "Letter dated 1 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council", and item 45, entitled "Letter dated 19 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council".

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Slaheddine ABDELLAH
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly
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S/1996/752
13 September 1996

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 55
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 13 September 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith for your attention and that of the membership of the General Assembly and of the Security Council the text of a letter dated 11 September 1996 from the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, addressed to the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf Denktash (annex I), enclosing a copy of a letter dated 17 December 1993 from President Clerides addressed to you regarding his proposal on the demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus.

I also enclose a copy of a public statement made today (13 September 1996) regarding the situation created after the recent tragic events in Cyprus (annex II).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annexes could be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nicos AGATHOCLEOUS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX I

Letter dated 11 September 1996 from the President of Cyprus addressed to Mr. Rauf Denktash

My attention has been drawn to a public interview in which you are reported to have said, inter alia, that we should meet in order to cool the atmosphere and that it does not matter if we do not discuss the Cyprus problem, the fact alone that the two leaders can meet and that we are on speaking terms will mean something.

I fully share your view that steps are needed to cool the situation, but in my view such steps must be convincing. A meeting between us at this stage and a common statement will be unconvincing and will not defuse the situation, but it will give ground for public arguments that will add to the tension.

The reasons I am holding this view are as follows.

There is indisputable photographic and other evidence that in the case of the murder of Solomos Solomou, which occurred on 14 August, Kenan Akin, a settler from Turkey, was aiming his pistol in the direction of the victim and Ertal Emanet, "Police Chief Inspector and Commander of Special Forces", was actually firing his weapon at the victim. Present at the time also were Attila Sav, "Chief of the Turkish Cypriot Police", Lieutenant-General Hassan Kountaksi, Commander at the time of the Turkish Forces in Cyprus, and Major-General Mehmet Karli, Commander of the 28th Infantry Division. Mr. Akin was made "Minister of Agriculture and Forest" on the Turkish side three days after the murder of Solomos Solomou.

You will realize that, as far as the Greek Cypriot community is concerned, a murder committed before so many officials and with the participation of some of them cannot be washed away by a meeting between us and by an appeal for calm.

Regarding the killing of one soldier and the wounding of another of the Turkish side, you have already drawn the premature conclusion and stated publicly that it was a revenge killing by the Greek Cypriot side, without waiting for the result of the independent inquiry of the United Nations or the British bases and without waiting for the result of our investigations.

May I remind you of a similar situation in 1975, when there was much greater tension than now. You telephoned me that a Turkish woman and her children were missing and that a revenge killing was suspected. Despite the great tension at that time, as Acting President of the Republic, I ordered an investigation. As a result, John Antoniou Vouniotis was arrested and tried by a Court. He was convicted and sentenced to death. President Makarios, who as a priest was against the death penalty, reduced his sentence to life imprisonment. He served his sentence. The conviction and sentence contributed greatly to the reduction of tension.

May I also remind you that on another occasion when a Turkish Cypriot was fired upon and killed by a sentry of a National Guard camp, though one might

have claimed that he was unlawfully trying to get into the camp, full compensation was paid to his family.

In my view, a convincing step that we can now take together and which will really and permanently defuse the tension is to meet and discuss the issue of demilitarization on the lines of the proposal I made in my letter to the Secretary-General on 17 December 1993, a copy of which is attached herewith for easy reference (see appendix).

I am also enclosing copies of the photographic evidence.

APPENDIX

Letter dated 17 December 1993 from the President of Cyprus addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to inform you that I have paid special attention and given deep consideration to paragraph 102 of your report to the Security Council of 22 November 1993 (S/26777), in which you point out:

> "There is every justification for demanding that the two sides on the island, as well as Turkey and Greece, work more effectively for a negotiated settlement, in return for the great efforts of the international community".

During my deliberations regarding what could be done by my Government to contribute effectively towards a negotiated settlement, I took into consideration, inter alia, paragraph 101 (c) of your report, which states

> "The status quo, which the Security Council has deemed to be unacceptable, was established through the use of force and is sustained by military strength",

and paragraph 105, which states:

> "I would urge once again that as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops envisaged in the set of ideas, the Turkish forces, on the island be reduced to their level of 1982 and this be reciprocated by a suspension of weapons acquisition programmes on the Greek Cypriot side."

There is no doubt that the massive presence of Turkish military forces in the occupied part of Cyprus creates serious anxieties and mistrust amongst the Greek Cypriot community regarding Turkish intentions. It also imposes on the Government of the Republic the need to increase the defensive capabilities of the country by purchasing arms. Further, it makes it necessary to request military help from Greece and to include Cyprus in the Greek defensive plans. There are also indications that the above preparations, though entirely defensive in their nature, are misinterpreted and cause anxiety and mistrust within the Turkish Cypriot community regarding Greek intentions.

After careful consideration, I came to the conclusion that in order to brake the counter-productive climate of fear and mistrust and thus enhance the prospects of a negotiated settlement the Government of the Republic should take the following steps:

(a) Repeal the National Guard Law, disband the National Guard and hand all its arms and military equipment to the custody of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force;

(b) Undertake to maintain the police force of the Republic at its present numerical strength, armed only with light personal weapons;

(c) Undertake the total cost of a substantially numerically increased United Nations Peace-keeping Force;

(d) Agree that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force will have the right of inspection to ascertain compliance with the above;

(e) Agree that the National Guard armoured cars, armoured personnel vehicles and tanks, which will be handed to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force for custody, can be used by the United Nations Peace-keeping Force to patrol the buffer zone and to prevent intrusions into it;

(f) Deposit in a United Nations account all money saved from disbanding the National Guard and from stopping the purchase of arms, after deducting the cost of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, to be used after the solution of the problem for the benefit of both communities.

The above offer is made provided the Turkish side agrees also that parallel to the above the Turkish forces are withdrawn from Cyprus and that the Turkish Cypriot armed forces disband and hand their weapons and military equipment to the custody of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force.

I wish also to reaffirm what I told Mr. Feissel before leaving for New York, that is, that I am ready to discuss the modalities regarding the implementation of the confidence-building measures and of course the solution of the Cyprus problem.

I hope the Turkish side will respond positively to my proposal, otherwise the only logical inference to be drawn will be that the massive presence of Turkish forces is not for the alleged safety of the Turkish Cypriot community, but for the perpetuation of the status quo, which, as stated in your report, has been created by military force and is sustained by military strength and which the Security Council has deemed unacceptable. Such an inference will impose on my Government the need to increase substantially the defensive capabilities of the Republic and to enter into arrangements with Greece regarding a common defensive plan.

(Signed) Glafcos CLERIDES
President of the Republic
of Cyprus

ANNEX II

Statement made on 13 September 1996 by the President of Cyprus

I have been carefully considering the situation created after the tragic events that have taken place over the past month. It is my considered view that, despite the fact that the crimes committed have been condemned, nevertheless considerable anxiety exists in Cyprus as a result of the tension they have created.

I therefore felt the necessity to make it absolutely clear that we have not and will not waver from our intention to continue with even more energy the effort to find a solution to the Cyprus problem by peaceful means, through negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, based on the high-level agreements and the relevant United Nations resolutions for a bi-zonal bi-communal federation.

The tragic events should not in any way be interpreted as showing an incompatibility of both communities to live together in peace and prosperity in Cyprus, our common home.

We will take the necessary measures to prevent any escalation of the present tension. I call therefore upon the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to make every effort to defuse the tension in the interest of peace.

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S/1996/753
13 September 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVES OF GUINEA-BISSAU ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 10 September 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Guinea-Bissau to the United Nations, stating that M. Fali Embalo and M. Nagib Jamal have been appointed alternate representatives of Guinea-Bissau on the Security Council.

2. In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

96-24049 (E) 130996

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/754
13 September 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 1061 (1996) of 14 June 1996, in which the Security Council requested me to report to it every three months on the progress towards a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict and on the operations of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). The report provides an account of developments since my last report of 7 June 1996 (S/1996/412).

Fighting in the Tavildara sector in June/July

2. The situation in Tajikistan has been very tense, especially in the area of Tavildara, where intense fighting continued between government and opposition forces. UNMOT was not able to obtain first-hand information on the fighting but followed events through the monitoring of troop movements and information received from persons fleeing the area of confrontation.

3. Following the fall of Tavildara to the opposition on 11/12 May, the Government launched its counter-attack on 2 June. Its forces attacked from three directions: from the north-west against Childara, from the south-east in the vicinity of Kalai-Hussein and from the south-west against positions of the opposition approximately 8 kilometres from Tavildara. According to persons from the area, the Government forces were supported by fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. At the same time, in early to mid-June, the opposition attacked government installations in the Garm region on several occasions, apparently to relieve pressure on it in the area of Childara.

Talks in Ashgabat

4. In view of the volatile situation in the country and the continued large-scale fighting in the Tavildara sector, the third phase of the inter-Tajik talks at Ashgabat, which took place from 8 to 21 July 1996, concentrated primarily on the immediate restoration of the cease-fire, the extension of the Tehran Agreement (S/1994/1102, annex I) and the working out of a schedule and agenda for further talks. The delegation of the Government was headed by

Talbak Nazarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the delegation of the opposition was led by Akbar Turajonzodah, First Deputy Chairman of the United Tajik Opposition. My Special Representative, Gerd Merrem, chaired the talks. Representatives from Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) attended the talks as observers.

5. Both parties agreed on the need for an immediate cease-fire. However, initially they insisted on different modalities for the cessation of hostilities, particularly in the Tavildara zone. The Government put forward the demand that the opposition withdraw to the positions held prior to 28 January 1996, along the left bank of the Ragnov river south of Lairon village. The opposition favoured maintaining the positions occupied by the two sides on the date of the signing of the agreement. After intensive negotiations, the parties agreed on the joint declaration on the cessation of hostilities and observance of the Tehran Agreement (annex I).

6. Under the terms of the joint declaration, the two parties were to cease hostilities in the Tavildara sector at 1200 hours local time on 20 July 1996. At the same time, they were to submit to UNMOT precise information concerning the deployment of their forces along the line of contact. UNMOT was requested to deploy two teams of military observers to the Tavildara zone on either side of the line of contact to verify the information provided by the parties on their positions and to monitor the observance of the provisions of the Tehran Agreement in this area. The parties guaranteed the freedom of movement of the Joint Commission members and the United Nations military observers. In addition, the parties extended the Tehran Agreement until 31 December 1996.

7. The two parties also signed a protocol on the exchange of an equal number of prisoners of war and detainees (annex II). The opposition also reconfirmed its previous commitment, made in May, for the unconditional return of 26 prisoners of war. These prisoners were still with the opposition because their return could not be arranged for lack of adequate security guarantees. The two parties requested the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to assist in these exchanges.

8. In a joint communiqué (annex III) the parties confirmed their commitment to a settlement of the conflict by political means. They agreed on an intense schedule of further talks and consultations until the end of the current year, with a view to reaching agreements on key interrelated political and military issues. The parties agreed to resume their talks in the near future. However, the question of venue remained unresolved; the opposition wished the next round to be held at Tehran, while the Government preferred Ashgabat.

Efforts to implement the Ashgabat agreement

9. On 20 July, two UNMOT teams prepared to deploy to Tavildara sector, one team proceeding from direction Khovaling and the other from Labijar. A third UNMOT team was instructed to proceed towards Tavildara from Kalaikhum for better monitoring and support. However, UNMOT immediately encountered obstacles. The Khovaling team was stopped at Devdor government checkpoint, 130 kilometres

south-west of Tavildara, where government servicemen prohibited their passage, citing ignorance of the Ashgabat agreement, lack of instructions from their headquarters, the presence of landmines along the way and ongoing fighting in the area; at the same time, official and private vehicles were allowed to pass. The team approaching from Labijar junction was not permitted by government soldiers to advance beyond Childara, while the Kalaikhum team, after many attempts to pass the government checkpoints, was permitted on 27 July to advance as far as the Rigak mountain pass 12 kilometres south-east of Tavildara, from where the observers could hear intermittent artillery fire coming from the direction of Tavildara. UNMOT held almost daily meetings with the Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Security but continued to be prevented from deploying, despite repeated assurances by the Government.

10. On 30 July, an UNMOT team visited Taloqan to discuss the implementation of the Ashgabat agreement with leaders of the United Tajik Opposition. The opposition informed UNMOT of its forward positions as at 20 July, briefed it about military developments in the Tavildara sector, agreed to identify potential UNMOT team sites behind their forward defensive positions once they had been verified and to establish communication with UNMOT in the Tavildara sector, as foreseen in the joint declaration.

11. On 5 August, Mr. Merrem discussed the implementation of the Ashgabat agreement with President Emomali Rakhmonov. The latter informed Mr. Merrem of the creation of a National Security Council for better coordination of strategic concerns and implementation of the cease-fire. At the Council's first meeting on 3 August he had instructed the Ministers of Defence, Security and the Interior to observe to the full extent the Government's obligations under the Ashgabat joint declaration and to facilitate UNMOT access to the Tavildara sector. He also said that he wished to complete the exchange of prisoners of war and detainees even prior to the agreed completion date of 20 August, and that the government side accepted the opposition's list without conditions. Despite these assurances, UNMOT continued to be prevented from carrying out its tasks. One team was permitted by government forces to enter Tavildara briefly on 8 August but was not allowed to interview civilians or to establish a permanent presence there. On 14 August, Mr. Merrem informed the Government by note verbale that UNMOT, some three and a half weeks after signing the joint declaration, continued to stand ready to deploy observers in the Tavildara sector, but needed a clear and lasting commitment by the government structures to observe the provisions of the Ashgabat agreement.

12. Continuing efforts aimed at the implementation of the Ashgabat agreement, Brigadier-General Hasan Abaza, UNMOT Chief Military Observer, reached Tavildara on 4 September with two UNMOT teams and accompanied by Joint Commission members. He confirmed that the town was in the hands of the government forces. Because of ongoing fighting, one UNMOT team was stationed some distance from the town but continued daily patrols to Tavildara and its environs.

13. Fighting in the Tavildara sector has caused numerous casualties on both sides. The opposition claims to hold some 600 prisoners; no figures have been made public by the Government. The fighting has resulted in the destruction of civilian infrastructure in Tavildara sector and the disruption of the main road leading from Labijar junction via Tavildara across the Kuborobat mountain pass

to Kalaikhum in Gorny Badakhshan. In Tavildara itself, approximately 15 per cent of the town has been completely destroyed and 25 per cent heavily damaged. The town is now almost completely deserted except for some elderly persons and children.

14. Both the Government and the opposition have engaged in large-scale mine laying, including large numbers of anti-personnel mines. In the Tavildara sector, the minefields stretch from Khavzi Kabud in the west to Sayod in the east, and from approximately 21 kilometres south-west of Tavildara to Sagirdasht in the south-east. Because of the mine hazard, UNMOT has restricted travel by United Nations organizations to that area, and the area north of the road Dushanbe-Garm. Local inhabitants have also reported that the Russian border forces have air-dropped anti-personnel mines along the Tajik-Afghan border from Kalaikhum to Kurgovad (approximately 30 kilometres to the east).

15. There has been no progress in the implementation of the Ashgabat Protocol on the Exchange of Prisoners of War and Detainees. The deadline of 20 August was not met because the Government was not able to provide the final list of prisoners of war. The exchange of the first group of 60 from each side was rescheduled for 9 September but it was prevented by fighting in the Karategin valley. The return of 26 prisoners of war held by the opposition failed to materialize because the previously agreed security arrangements were not in place.

16. Throughout the reporting period, UNMOT activities were severely constrained by restrictions of movement imposed by both the government and the opposition. On the government side, in addition to preventing access to the Tavildara area, restrictions were applied on the road between Dushanbe and Garm at a government checkpoint at Labijar junction and also on the road from Moskovskiy through Khovaling and from Moskovskiy to Shuroabad, which is on the way to the Afghan border. On the opposition side, occasional restrictions were applied in the Garm area.

Other developments

17. Elsewhere in Tajikistan, the situation has deteriorated since June. In the north, repeated demonstrations were held in Leninabad province, amid demands for changes in the appointment of senior local officials and a review of economic policies and practices. Demonstrations in Tursunzade, to the west of Dushanbe, turned into violent clashes between two local paramilitary groups, resulting in a number of casualties. Disturbances also occurred in the Shaartuz district of the southern province of Khatlon.

18. In Dushanbe and in the Karategin valley, a number of violent acts heightened the tension. On 19 June, a bus transporting Ministry of Defence personnel was ambushed by unknown persons in the outskirts of Dushanbe. Nine soldiers were wounded, two of them critically. On 29 July, Muhamad Asimi, former President of the Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan, was assassinated in Dushanbe. On 15 August, two bomb explosions occurred in Dushanbe, one at a restaurant in the centre of the city, causing casualties, and the other in a suburban area, when a remote-controlled explosive device went off under a truck

transporting personnel of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Peace-keeping Force, killing a Russian soldier and injuring two others. In the first week of August, the mayor of Tajikabad, north-east of Garm, who also served as representative of President Rakhmonov to the region, was assassinated. No one has claimed responsibility for the above-mentioned cases. The United Tajik Opposition has denied any involvement.

19. In the early morning hours of 21 July, a Ministry of the Interior unit of approximately 200 servicemen supported by tanks and armoured vehicles surrounded the village of Teppi-Samarkandi 10 kilometres east of Dushanbe. In six hours of fighting, 11 persons were killed and many others injured.

20. Since the beginning of September, the situation in the Karategin valley has deteriorated. On 5 September, the opposition, after a firefight with the government forces, took control of Jirgatal in the eastern part of the valley. UNMOT observers who tried to go to the area were stopped by the opposition fighters. On 12 September, the opposition, without a fight, took control of Tajikabad, between Jirgatal and Garm. As a result, the opposition now controls the valley from Garm to the Kyrgyz border. The Government has been assembling forces east of Dushanbe to counter the opposition's advances. For its part, the opposition has been concentrating fighters in the area of Komsomolabad to block those government forces.

21. The UNMOT Chief Military Observer and the co-chairmen of the Joint Commission have met with field commanders of the opposition in order to assess the situation and prevent further escalation. UNMOT has urged the opposition to halt its offensive in the Karategin valley and return to its previous positions, while the Government should withdraw its reinforcements. At the time of reporting, UNMOT efforts were still ongoing.

22. Tension also mounted along the Tajik-Afghan border in Gorny Badakhshan, notably in the Vanj and Khorog areas. The Russian border forces reported a build-up of opposition fighters in Afghanistan who were meant, they said, to reinforce the fighters already in Tajikistan. The Russian border forces have established additional positions along the border and reinforced their units. A number of ethnic Tajiks, who make up the majority of their personnel, are to be replaced by Russians. The situation along the border has been the subject of contacts between the Governments of Afghanistan, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan.

Advancing the negotiating process

23. The continuing fighting and the concentration of efforts on the restoration of the cease-fire had the effect of diverting attention from the difficult political issues on the agenda. In order to prevent these issues from being pushed aside and the negotiating process delayed even further, I instructed Mr. Merrem to resume discussions with the parties and others concerned, despite the ongoing hostilities, with a view to resuming substantive negotiations.

24. Being stationed in Dushanbe, Mr. Merrem was in frequent touch with government representatives throughout the period. From 20 to 23 August 1996, he

visited Tehran where he met Mr. A. Turajonzodah and other opposition leaders. They confirmed their will to resume substantive talks as soon as possible to consider the core political issues, although the question of venue for the next round remained unresolved. The opposition representatives said that a well-prepared meeting between President Rakhmonov and opposition leader Abdullo Nuri could be an important step towards a comprehensive solution to the problem. They reiterated their request to my Special Representative for his assistance in the substantive preparation for any such meeting. During his visit to Tehran, Mr. Merrem also had consultations with Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and his Deputy, Mahmoud Vaezi.

25. On 10 September, Mr. Merrem travelled to Moscow for discussions with the Russian authorities.

Joint Commission

26. The opposition members of the Joint Commission returned to Dushanbe on 28 June, after the Government gave written guarantees for their security. The Joint Commission held its first meeting on 1 July. UNMOT supported the activities of the Joint Commission. In particular, it assisted the Commission in arranging meetings in August between opposition field commanders and local government representatives at Garm, where the situation had become tense. As a result, tensions between the local government authorities and the opposition were greatly reduced, allowing a measure of normalization, for example, the resumption of civilian road transport between Dushanbe and Garm and beyond.

27. On 16 August, 16 officials from the Yavan district south-east of Dushanbe and members of the CIS Peace-keeping Force were captured by an opposition field commander, who demanded the release of opposition members in the custody of the Government. Following UNMOT and Joint Commission intervention, on 18 August all but four local government officials were released, and on 20 August the others were released in exchange for the prisoners held by the Government. Members of UNMOT and the Joint Commission witnessed the exchange. Prior to the resolution of the situation, the opposition leadership, citing security concerns, had instructed their members in the Joint Commission to return to Taloqan. This instruction was subsequently rescinded.

Liaison office at Taloqan

28. UNMOT has received the approval of the Government of Afghanistan to establish a civilian liaison team at Taloqan. The United Nations is in the process of concluding a status agreement with that Government, and the establishment of the team is envisaged in the near future.

Humanitarian and rehabilitation efforts

29. During the reporting period, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Organization for

Migration (IOM), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO), the latter through a local liaison officer, were present in the country, in addition to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), representational office and the liaison office of the World Bank. WFP, which conducts the largest humanitarian operation in Tajikistan, also coordinates activities of all agencies distributing food in the country. WFP and international non-governmental organizations identified some 620,000 persons requiring relief food assistance, among whom WFP is targeting some 400,000 persons. There is concern about the decreasing volume of food aid being made available by donors for 1996.

30. UNICEF, in cooperation with WHO, has undertaken vaccination campaigns against diphtheria and plans to continue primary vaccination work into 1997, a service it has provided since 1993. UNICEF is also engaged in a water sanitation programme for rural areas, peace education and the provision of educational supplies and health and nutrition assistance. UNHCR has scaled down its operations significantly since 1995 but continues, through its liaison office, to be involved in the repatriation of small numbers of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan and Turkmenistan and in the rebuilding of damaged homes. It is negotiating, through an international non-governmental organization, a group lending programme for returnees. It has also launched a legal capacity-building programme under which assistance is provided to the national courts, lawyers, judges and police structures.

31. Within the framework of a large-scale rural rehabilitation and reconstruction programme, UNDP is setting up offices in Garm and Kulyab to launch multi-sectoral development projects in areas most affected by the war to date. Activities continue in the sphere of peace- and confidence-building, promotion of small enterprises and governance, with funding being sought for further activities. IMF is providing balance of payments support to the Government. The World Bank hopes to approve a US$ 50 million loan package in September 1996 and negotiations are under way with the Government and potential implementation partners for a $10 million poverty alleviation programme planned for January 1997 pending the elaboration of a large proposal emphasizing capacity-building in this domain.

32. In spite of these activities, there is a continuing chronic emergency situation in Tajikistan, in particular with regard to essential food needs. The 1996 cereal harvest is expected to be larger than last year; however, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that Tajikistan will continue to need assistance in 1996/97 to cover its cereal import requirements. Urgent measures are needed to address the deteriorating health situation, including outbreaks of diarrhoea and typhoid epidemics, as well as malaria, which is reported by WHO to be totally out of control. Continued emergency assistance is also required for the provision of shelter and rehabilitation of public services.

33. Many civilians have been displaced by the fighting in the Tavildara sector. ICRC estimates that approximately 16,500 have fled the Tavildara region, the majority to Dushanbe (6,500), Kalaikhum and Darwaz district (6,500), and the remainder to Komsomolabad (400), Garm (400), Khovaling (800), Kafirnigan area (700) and Khatlon region (1,000). They have been provisionally housed in

mosques, schools and other makeshift lodgings. Many more have been indirectly affected by the fighting through the lack of basic public services like medical care and the loss of harvest and livestock, as well as the disruption of relief supplies. The local government structures are increasingly unable to handle the large number of internally displaced persons. The Aga Khan Foundation (in Gorny Badakhshan), ICRC and United Nations system agencies and non-governmental organizations are providing humanitarian assistance.

Observations

34. As is evident from the present report, the situation in Tajikistan has deteriorated in the last three months. The agreements reached in Ashgabat last July, which provided a real opportunity to stop fighting, have not been implemented. On the contrary, in addition to the heavy fighting in the Tavildara sector, military confrontations intensified in the Karategin valley and the Garm district. A tense situation exists on the Tajik-Afghan border. The activities of UNMOT have been impeded by restrictions on the freedom of movement of the military observers. These developments, which contradict the stated intentions of the Tajik parties to resolve the conflict through political means, are a cause of serious concern. Clearly, hostilities must cease immediately.

35. In the present circumstances, it is imperative to resume the political dialogue. In this context, I have taken note of the recent statements of President Rakhmonov and Mr. Nuri on their readiness to resume their direct contacts. I welcome these intentions and hope that such contacts at the highest level will give much-needed impetus to the negotiating process. I have instructed my Special Representative to provide any assistance in the preparation of such a meeting.

36. The people of Tajikistan are faced with an acute crisis, which has been aggravated by the ongoing hostilities and the continuing deterioration of the economy. The displacement of civilians by the thousands has further exacerbated the emergency and has increased the number of vulnerable groups of the population, who are unable to meet their basic survival needs without assistance. In view of this, I have asked the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to arrange for an inter-agency mission to Tajikistan to help determine how the United Nations system may respond most effectively to the situation.

Annex I

Joint declaration signed at Ashgabat on 19 July 1996 on the cessation of hostilities and observance of the Tehran Agreement

The delegation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition at the inter-Tajik talks (hereinafter referred to as "the parties"), with a view to normalizing the situation in the country, preventing human casualties and suffering and the destruction of the infrastructure and material values, and creating the necessary conditions for the successful conclusion of the talks and the achievement of peace and national accord in Tajikistan, have agreed as follows:

1. To halt combat operations and other hostile acts within the country, particularly in the Tavildara area, and on the Tajik-Afghan border, in accordance with the provisions of the Tehran Agreement on a Temporary Ceasefire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the Country. The agreement shall enter into force at 1200 hours local time on the day after the signing of this joint declaration.

2. The armed forces of the parties shall remain in the positions they were holding on the day of the signing of this declaration. At the same time, the competent and authorized representatives of the parties shall submit to the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) precise information concerning the deployment of their armed formations along the line of contact. With a view to strengthening further the regime relating to the cease-fire and the cessation of other hostile acts, the parties have also agreed to carry out additional confidence-building measures, including the disengagement of forces in the Tavildara area. The aforementioned confidence-building measures shall be agreed upon by the Joint Commission, with the assistance of UNMOT, within 10 days following the signing of this joint declaration; particular emphasis shall be placed on the need to guarantee safe and unimpeded movement of national economic goods and civilians along the Dushanbe-Khorog road.

3. Within three days following the signing of the joint declaration, UNMOT shall deploy two groups of its military observers in the Tavildara area on either side of the line of contact. The United Nations military observers shall immediately verify the information received from the parties relating to their positions along the parties' front line of defence, and shall monitor the strict and conscientious observance of the provisions of the Tehran Agreement in this area.

4. The parties guarantee the complete security and freedom of movement of the members of the Joint Commission and the United Nations military observers and shall provide them with all kinds of assistance in their performance of their duties.

5. The armed forces of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the armed formations of the opposition in the area under their control shall clear mines and remove blockades from roads and guarantee the safe movement of

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national economic goods, humanitarian supplies and civilians, including civilians returning to their homes, along such roads.

6. With a view to strengthening the monitoring of the observance of the Tehran Agreement and preventing possible violations of the Agreement, the United Nations observers shall establish in the Tavildara area wireless communication with the field commanders of the armed formations of the opposition and the commanders of units of the armed forces of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan. The lists of these commanders shall be transmitted to UNMOT.

7. The delegation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan requests the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to speed up the decision on the deployment of an UNMOT liaison base of Taloqan and of other observation posts in districts of the Republic of Tajikistan that border on the territory of the Islamic State of Afghanistan with the consent of its Government.

8. The United Nations military observers and the Joint Commission shall examine complaints from the parties concerning possible violations of the Tehran Agreement and shall inform UNMOT and the parties of the results of their investigation.

9. The parties shall extend the Tehran Agreement until 31 December 1996.

(Signed) T. NAZAROV
Head of the delegation
of the Government of the
Republic of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. TURAJONZODAH
Head of the delegation
of the United Tajik
Opposition

(Signed) G. MERREM
Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

Annex II

Protocol signed at Ashgabat on 21 July 1996 on the implementation of a humanitarian action involving the exchange of prisoners of war and detainees

Guided by humanitarian considerations and desiring to create a favourable atmosphere for the successful conclusion of the inter-Tajik negotiations process, the delegations of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition at the inter-Tajik talks (hereinafter referred to as "the parties") have agreed:

1. To conduct in Khorog, until 20 August 1996, a step-by-step exchange of an equal number of prisoners of war and detainees in accordance with the lists to be transmitted by the parties to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) before the end of the current round of inter-Tajik talks in Ashgabat. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan will submit the list of prisoners of war and the United Tajik Opposition will submit the list of detainees.

2. To request ICRC to provide assistance in the implementation of this humanitarian operation, on the understanding that it will be conducted in accordance with the rules and procedures of that organization.

3. To instruct the Joint Commission to coordinate with ICRC on all possible questions related to the implementation of the operation involving prisoners and detainees.

4. Until 26 July 1996, with the assistance of ICRC and in the presence of 5 family representatives, to return 26 prisoners of war, freed earlier by the opposition without preconditions, to their homes.

5. To confirm their earlier commitment to ensure the unimpeded access by delegates of ICRC and members of the Joint Commission to places where the detainees and prisoners of war are being held, both during the present operation and in future. The parties guarantee their safety and freedom of movement and shall provide them with all kinds of assistance in their performance of their duties.

(Signed) T. NAZAROV
Head of the delegation
of the Government of
the Republic of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. TURAJONZODAH
Head of the delegation of the
United Tajik Opposition

(Signed) G. MERREM
Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

Annex III

Joint communiqué signed on 21 July 1996 on the outcome of the third round of inter-Tajik talks, held at Ashgabat from 8 to 21 July 1996

The third Ashgabat round of inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation was held from 8 to 21 July 1996. The delegation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan was headed by Mr. T. Nazarov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, and the delegation of the United Tajik Opposition was headed by Mr. A. Turajonzodah, First Deputy Leader of the United Tajik Opposition. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. G. Merrem, served as mediator in the talks.

The talks were held in a frank and businesslike atmosphere. This made possible the signing of the joint declaration on the cessation of hostilities and observance of the Tehran Agreement. With a view to increasing the effectiveness of the Agreement, additional measures were elaborated to strengthen the monitoring of its strict observance by the parties. In addition, an agreement was reached on extending the Tehran Agreement to 31 December 1996.

Guided by humanitarian considerations, the parties signed a protocol on the implementation, until 20 August 1996, of a humanitarian action involving the exchange of an equal number of prisoners of war and detainees. The parties requested the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to provide assistance in this humanitarian operation.

The parties confirmed their commitment to a settlement of the conflict by political means. In this regard, they agreed on an intense schedule for holding further talks and consultations until the end of the current year with a view to reaching agreements on key interrelated political and military issues. The parties agreed to resume their talks in the near future in order to discuss a series of political issues. The time and place for holding the next round of talks will be determined by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in consultation with the parties.

The parties express their deep gratitude to the Government of Turkmenistan for its hospitality, assistance and the excellent conditions it provided for the holding of productive talks.

The parties also express their thanks to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Gerd Merrem, and to the representatives of the observer States at the talks and the observer of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for their assistance in the conduct of the inter-Tajik talks.

(Signed) T. NAZAROV
Head of the delegation
of the Government of the
Republic of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. TURAJONZODAH
Head of the delegation of the
United Tajik Opposition

(Signed) G. MERREM
Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

وزع بعثة مراقبي الأمم المتحدة في طاجيكستان
اعتبارا من أيلول/سبتمبر ١٩٩٦
1996年09月联塔观察团的部署情况
UNMOT DEPLOYMENT AS OF SEPTEMBER 1996
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA MONUT EN SEPTEMBRE 1996
РАЗМЕЩЕНИЕ МНООТ ПО СОСТОЯНИЮ НА СЕНТЯБРЬ 1996
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNMOT EN SEPTIEMBRE DE 1996
UZBEKISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
CHINA
AFGHANISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
LENINABAD
KUHISTONI BADAKHSHON
(GORNIY BADAKSHAN)
KHATLON
Dushanbe
Kulob
(Kulyab)
Qurghonteppa
(Kurgan-Tyube)
Kolkhozabad
Kalininabad
Shuroabad
Moskovskiy
Dangara
Tursunzade
Hisor
(Gissar)
Kafirnigan
Nurek
Khovaling
Kalaikhum
Vanj
Kudara
Rangkul'
Murgab
Rushan
Kalot
Buvad
Vir
Khorugh
Dzhartyrabot
Shaymak
Jirgatal'
Garm
Komsomolabad
Lenin
Sayod
Childara
Sicharog
Tavildara
Dashtishur
Wakhio
Panjakent
Ayni
Shahriostan
Uroteppa
Istaravshan
Khujand
(Leninabad)
Chkalovsk
Kanibadam
Isfara
Tabashar
Kokand
Batabad
Lake Aydarkul
Syr Darya
Zeravshan
Nurek Reservoir
Vakhsh
Yakhsu
Panj
Surkhob
Ragnau
Obikhingou
Karategin
Lake Karakul'
Lake Sarezskoye
Murgab
Bartang
Gunt
Pamir
Kafirnigan
Surkhan Darya
Amu Darya
Termez
Shaartuz
Nizhniy Panj
Shir Khan
Panj
Feyzabad
Kazidi
Vrang
Ishkashim
Kholm
(Tashkurghan)
Qonduz
Taloqan
Khanabad
Samangan
Baghlan
0 25 50 75 100 km
0 25 50 75 mi
70°
72°
74°
40°
38°
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
HQ
القيادة العامة للبعثة
联塔观察团总部
UNMOT headquarters
Quartier général de la MONUT
Штаб МНООНТ
Sede de la UNMOT
T
موقع الفريق
队址
Team site
Antenne de la MONUT
Базы групп на местах
Equipo
Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section
Map No. 3887 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS
September 1996

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/755
14 September 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to forward to you, as an annex of the present letter, a letter addressed to the President of the United Nations Security Council dated 14 September 1996, from Dr. Halid Genjac, President of the Main Board of the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA)), regarding the elections held today in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and specifically in the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I would be grateful for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter and its annex as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative
Special Envoy

96-24185 (E) 160996 170996

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Annex

Letter dated 14 September 1996 from the President of the Main Board of the Party of Democratic Action addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Party of Democratic Action has in good faith both promoted the conditions for "free and fair" elections and participated in the electoral process culminating in the vote today, 14 September 1996. Even before the results of the vote are known, unfortunately, it is clear that in many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, specifically the Serb entity, the necessary conditions did not exist to provide for free and fair elections under either the criteria established by the Dayton/Paris Agreement or even marginal standards of democracy.

The international community, in particular the sponsors of the Dayton/Paris Agreement, had committed that the necessary conditions would exist at least by the date of the elections. This also unfortunately has not been achieved by today, 14 September 1996. In fact, the lack of the necessary general conditions has been compounded by the new evidence of technical irregularities that has developed or come to light at the electional polls. These irregularities and the lack of the necessary conditions for free and fair elections have flawed the vote.

For the above reasons, the Party of Democratic Action deems the results of elections in the Serb entity to be legally invalid. We request that the above-mentioned matters and related evidence be reviewed in the proper forums, including the Security Council.

We have requested meetings with Minister Cotti, Ambassador Froewick and Mr. van Thijn to voice and present the further specifics of our concerns. We will also forward information and our request for appropriate consideration to the United Nations Security Council and other appropriate regional and international organizations.

(Signed) Halid GENJAC
President of the Main Board

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/756
16 September 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 12 September 1996.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) KIM Hyong U
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-24249 (E) 160996 170996

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Annex

Statement of the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 12 September 1996

According to south Korean media reports, the United States of America has recently been bringing into south Korea its war equipment, including tanks, armoured vehicles and communications equipment enough for a brigade, for the purpose of rapidly arming reinforcements to be sent to south Korea in the "event of contingency" on the Korean peninsula.

Simulating the "event of contingency", the United States military authorities are now openly shipping large quantities of military equipment into south Korea at a time when the United States Administration has failed, on one excuse or another, to implement its obligation, such as easing of economic sanctions under the Democratic People's Republic of Korea/United States Agreed Framework. It requires little penetration to see what it means.

In its negotiations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States has made many efforts to persuade the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its willingness to improve the Democratic People's Republic of Korea/United States relations and peace on the Korean peninsula.

However, indications today are that our constant distrust of the United States is not wrong.

Even after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea/United States Agreed Framework was signed, the United States has taken every opportunity and possibility systematically to carry out its arms build-up in south Korea in a planned way.

Over the past 40 odd years since the war in Korea, the United States has brought into south Korea large quantities of military equipment and war supplies, including nuclear weapons. And this year alone, it added hundreds of multi-purpose high-speed vehicles, "Abrams" tanks used in the Gulf war and the latest type of helicopters to south Korean-based United States forces.

Still unsatisfied with such additional deployment, they are openly reserving their war equipment for the purpose of arming reinforcement forces which will be dispatched from the United States mainland in case of the "event of contingency". And this in itself gives the conclusion that the United States military authorities, encouraged by conservatives, have obviously finalized a plan to unleash another war on the Korean peninsula such as the Gulf war and pushed ahead with its preparations at the final stage.

The present situation makes us feel deeply again how hypocritical the United States authorities' third-rate commitments to "peace on the Korean peninsula" and "observance of the Armistice Agreement" are.

It also hardens our thoughts that the United States has ignored our just roposal for the conclusion of a new interim agreement to replace the old rmistice Agreement in the hope of winning time to push ahead with war preparations.

We have always exercised the utmost vigilance against the United States' double game.

Furthermore, it should not go unnoticed that the United States' shipments of sophisticated military equipment into south Korea is timed to coincide with its recent missile attack on Iraq.

It is only too natural for us to keep ourselves fully ready to cope with the present situation at the time when the United States bellicose forces are resorting ever more to military means in the settlement of international problems.

We will continue to follow closely every single movement of the United States military authorities and to cope rapidly with it with proper steps.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/757
16 September 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1996 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ZAIRE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you a communiqué concerning events that have been taking place since 31 August 1996 in South Kivu province in eastern Zaire, following armed attacks by Banyamulenge from Rwanda crossing through Burundian territory.

The Government of the Republic of Zaire draws the attention of the Secretary-General and the Security Council to the gravity of the situation, which could lead to widespread confrontations unless strong pressure is brought to bear on the neighbouring republics of Rwanda and Burundi in order to make them abandon their acts of deliberate provocation.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) LUKABU KHABOUJI N'ZAJI
Charge d'affaires a. i.
Minister Plenipotentiary
Deputy Permanent Representative

96-24289 (E) 160996 160996 170996

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Annex

Government communiqué concerning the situation of Banyamulenge in South Kivu

1. Contrary to the information disseminated today, Thursday, 12 September 1996, by certain international media, principally the British Broadcasting Corporation, concerning the alleged persecution of the Banyamulenge population and members of Catholic and Protestant religious orders by elements of the Zairian armed forces acting on instructions from the Zairian authorities, the Government of the Republic of Zaire wishes to inform both national and international opinion of the following.

1.1 The events that are currently taking place in South Kivu on the Ruzizi plain in the area of Uvira involve armed confrontations between the Zairian armed forces and armed bands of Banyamulenge from Rwanda who make use of Burundian territory to attack Zaire.

1.2 Inquiries and interrogations conducted with detainees reveal that approximately 3,000 young Banyamulenge nationals living in Zaire informed the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) last year that they were refugees; they were repatriated to Rwanda where they were subsequently enlisted in the Rwandan Patriotic Army and trained to destabilize eastern Zaire.

The strategy of the sponsors of this project is to use these elements, who are completely familiar with Zairian territory, to exploit the hostility that exists in relations between the Banyamulenge and the local Zairian population on the subject of nationality, with a view to fomenting unrest in eastern Zaire.

1.3 The Banyamulenge elements have been responsible, from 31 August 1996 to today, for several violations of Zairian territory that resulted in casualties among the Zairian population.

1.4 These acts were conducted from Rwandan and Burundian territory.

1.5 Turning to the confessions, the Banyamulenge apprehended by the Zairian armed forces stated that the attackers had logistical support from certain United Nations agencies, foreign non-governmental organizations and the Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan armies. The quality of the military equipment and communications seized from them provides ample proof of this fact.

2. The Government of the Republic of Zaire notes with disappointment that this aggression is taking place after Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dondo's August visit to Kigali in order to seek a peaceful and lasting solution to the crisis in the Great Lakes region, through the unconditional repatriation of all Rwandan refugees in Zaire.

3. The Government of the Republic of Zaire is also surprised to learn that this aggression is being perpetrated after the Prime Minister's talks with high-level UNHCR officials in Geneva on 30 August 1996. During the talks, all the misunderstandings concerning the Kigali accords were resolved and the commitment of the two parties to do everything possible to ensure their implementation was reaffirmed.

4. The Government of the Republic of Zaire denounces and strongly condemns the behaviour of Rwanda and Burundi which, through their participation in the aggression being conducted by the Banyamulenge against Zaire, are violating the existing accords.

5. The Government of the Republic of Zaire considers them to be fully responsible for the inevitable consequences of these premeditated acts.

6. The Government of the Republic of Zaire also draws the attention of the Secretary-General and the Security Council to the behaviour of certain Member States that have a presence in the area, which have been increasing insecurity in the Great Lakes region with a view to destabilizing Zaire, and, at the international level, have been engaging in a disinformation campaign on behalf of obscure interests with a view to tarnishing our country's image.

Kinshasa, 13 September 1996

(Signed) Gérard KAMANDA Wa KAMANDA

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ANNEX

Letter dated 12 September 1996 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 9 September 1996 addressed to you by His Excellency Rauf Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in connection with the latest incident on the island, which involves the murder of a Turkish Cypriot soldier and the serious wounding of another by a Greek Cypriot special military unit.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 58 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus

APPENDIX

Letter dated 9 September 1996 from Mr. Rauf R. Denktas addressed to the Secretary-General

Since my last letter to you, dated 21 August 1996, further armed attacks and fatal violence have been directed towards Turkish Cypriot security forces within our borders.

It was the possibility of such violent armed attacks by the Greek Cypriot side, aimed at destabilizing the situation on the island, which, I am sure, prompted Your Excellency to suggest a face-to-face meeting between myself and Mr. Clerides and the release of a joint statement aimed at reducing the tension.

Sharing your sentiments, I, as you will recall, had promptly agreed. Mr. Clerides, however, saw no benefit in any move aimed at calming inflamed emotions.

Yesterday's murder of a Turkish Cypriot soldier and the serious wounding of another by a Greek Cypriot special military unit leads me to believe that the Greek Cypriot side, however, mistakenly, sees some advantages in heightened tension and violence. I myself do not share this belief.

Hence, with this letter, I feel duty bound to convey to you the grim details of this premeditated murder which occurred within the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

At approximately 4 a.m. on the morning of 8 September 1996, two soldiers from the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces fell victim to a cold-blooded attack while on guard duty. One of the Turkish Cypriot soldiers was instantly killed, while the other was seriously injured and is currently under intensive care.

The assailants violated the border of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the Kavercinlik area, by crossing a road within and under the control of the British Sovereign Base Area Authorities.

All available evidence indicates that this murder was the work of a specially trained unit of professional soldiers belonging to the Greek Cypriot National Guard. Empty shells compatible with Kalashnikov assault rifles were found near the scene of the attack. This particular weapon is commonly used in the Greek Cypriot National Guard arsenal and is issued to the Greek Cypriot militia.

This totally unprovoked attack was carried out under the cover of darkness and can only have been launched with the use of night vision equipment and by professionally trained personnel. Tracer bullets, also part of military equipment, were used.

Further investigations have revealed that plastic explosives were planted under a bridge on the SBA road, approximately 50 metres from the Turkish Cypriot

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enemy post. The tactics and weapons used in this attack bear the unmistakable hallmarks of a carefully pre-planned military operation.

I sincerely hope that the United Nations and the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) will strongly condemn and protest this criminal act with Mr. Clerides and stress upon him the utmost urgency of face to face talks as soon as possible in order to avert further loss of life. Mr. Clerides can no longer claim there is "no common ground" for negotiations to restart. If he genuinely wants a mutually acceptable solution and if he sincerely has any respect for the sanctity of human life he will come to the table and help strive for a solution. The parameters set out in your set of ideas should provide us with ample ground for result-oriented negotiation provided the Greek Cypriot side stops aspiring to convert Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot Republic.

(Signed) Rauf R. DENKTAŞ
President

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General Assembly
Security Council

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A/51/363
S/1996/759
17 September 1996
ENGLISH
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Items 11 and 147 of the provisional agenda*
REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 13 September 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 13 September 1996 addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the continuing violation of Iraq's sovereignty and of Iraqi airspace by United States forces.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under items 11 and 147 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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* A/51/150.

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ANNEX

Letter dated 13 September 1996 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to my letter of 11 September 1996 addressed to you (A/51/349-S/1996/742, annex), I should like to inform you that the United States is continuing its policy of aggression against Iraq. The United States forces of aggression and those who support them have continued to violate our airspace. In the violations committed on 11 September 1996, 15 sorties were flown by hostile aircraft over northern Iraq and 57 over southern Iraq; and in the violations committed on 12 September 1996, 15 sorties were flown by hostile aircraft over northern Iraq and 47 over southern Iraq. The sorties flown over northern Iraq were supported by an early-warning AWACS aircraft based in Turkey, and those flown over southern Iraq were supported by an AWACS aircraft based in Saudi Arabia.

Such military action constitutes overt aggression against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law.

I should also like to take this opportunity to direct your attention to the matter of the two "no-fly zones" imposed on Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom. The Government of Iraq has stated on many occasions in the past that the maintenance of these "no-fly zones" is a unilateral action taken in the context of the ongoing series of acts of armed aggression against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. The Government of the Republic of Iraq will require the States that have taken this action to bear international liability for the consequent damage sustained by Iraq.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq urges the United Nations to meet its responsibilities under the Charter and to take the necessary action to halt this aggression.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under items 11 and 147 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

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General Assembly
Security Council

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A/51/368
S/1996/760
17 September 1996
ENGLISH
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Items 11 and 147 of the provisional agenda*
REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 16 September 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 15 September 1996 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the continuing violation of the sovereignty of Iraq and intrusion upon its airspace by aggressive United States forces.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 11 and 147 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/51/150.

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Annex

Letter dated 15 September 1996 from the Deputy Prime Minister/Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to my letter to you of 13 September 1996, I should like to direct your attention to the continuing aggressive policy of the United States of America towards Iraq. The aggressive American forces and their supporters have continued to violate our airspace. On 13 September 1996, 42 sorties were flown over southern Iraq, supported by an early-warning AWACS aircraft which took off from Saudi Arabia.

This military action clearly constitutes aggression against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq, contravening the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law.

On this occasion, I should also like to direct your attention to the matter of the two 'no-fly zones' which the United States and the United Kingdom have imposed on Iraq. The Government of Iraq has repeatedly stated that the imposition of these 'no-fly zones' constitutes a continuing unilateral act of aggressive armed force directed against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. The Government of the Republic of Iraq will require the States that have taken this action to bear international liability for damage sustained by Iraq in consequence thereof.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq asks the United Nations to assume its responsibilities under the Charter by taking appropriate action to put a stop to this aggression.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 11 and 147 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister and
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

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LETTER DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 15 September 1996 addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the repeated Iranian acts of provocation and aggression along Iraq's borders.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/1996/767
English
Page 3

Annex

Letter dated 11 September 1996 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I should like to refer to my letter of 27 August 1996 concerning the violations being committed by the Iranian armed forces against the territory of the Republic of Iraq (S/1996/707, annex) and to inform you that Iranian acts of provocation against the security and territorial integrity of Iraq have been continuing, as set forth hereunder.

1. On 25 July 1996 the Iranian armed forces established a control point on the road running parallel to the border with Iraq near the Arafat post and the market place in the Badrah district. They stationed a number of soldiers there and erected a wire barrier inside Iraqi territory.

2. On 4 September 1996, as the United Arab Emirates tug Eagle was opposite the inspection point at Fa's al-Bayshah and heading for the port of Mutlayah, two armed Iranians managed to board it. They proceeded to fire a number of rounds, injuring the tug's Indian watchman. He was taken to Abadan hospital while the tug proceeded on its way to the port in question.

3. At various times, Iranian maritime patrols with personnel armed with Kalashnikov and GC assault rifles have intercepted and searched vessels entering and leaving the Shatt al-Arab. These patrols are based at:

(a) Hajj Salbukh Island, where there are eight small aluminium boats with 48-horsepower Yamaha motors, four of them grey and the others red and blue;

(b) The Abadan area, where there are four boats with 48-horsepower Yamaha motors, two of them made of aluminium and two of yellow fibreglass;

(c) Khosrow Abad, where there are four blue fibreglass boats with 200-horsepower Yamaha motors.

These acts of provocation and aggression represent a grave breach of the ceasefire in force between the two countries and are a flagrant violation of Iraq's territorial integrity and the principles of good-neighbourliness and friendly relations between States. They confirm the fact that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is persisting in its policy of defying such principles and that it lacks the desire to see security and stability established in the region.

The Government of Iraq protests anew against such acts of provocation. It urges the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to desist from this practice and calls upon it to abide by the Tehran agreement signed by the two countries in 1991, particularly as it relates to their agreement to refrain from mounting patrols in the Shatt al-Arab. It holds Iran fully responsible for the consequences of these acts of aggression, and it affirms Iraq's entitlement to seek compensation for the damage arising therefrom and its legitimate and lawful

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S/1996/762
16 September 1996
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LETTER DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 16 September 1996 addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the continuing incursions by the Turkish armed forces and their violations of the territory and airspace of the Republic of Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Letter dated 16 September 1996 from the Deputy Prime Minister/Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to my letter dated 7 August 1996, concerning the continuing incursions by the Turkish armed forces and their violations of the territory and airspace of the Republic of Iraq, I should like to inform you that the Turkish armed forces are continuing to carry out military operations inside the territory and airspace of Iraq under various pretexts, as is demonstrated by the following:

1. On 16 July 1996, Turkish combat aircraft and artillery bombarded the regions of Shirawan Mazin, Khawnah and Khakuk to a depth of 4 to 20 kilometres inside Iraqi territory, causing damage to private property.

2. On 17 July 1996, a party of Turkish journalists illegally entered Iraqi territory in the Zakho region and photographed the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline and pumping station.

3. On 18 July 1996, Turkish combat aircraft bombarded the regions of Banah and Kula Raqu to a depth of eight kilometres inside Iraqi territory, causing damage to the property of many citizens and wounding one person.

4. On 23 and 25 July 1996, Turkish combat aircraft bombarded five residential camps in the regions of Khakurk, Busi and Daulat Raqqah inside Iraqi territory.

5. On 23 July 1996, Turkish combat aircraft bombarded the regions of Busi, Daulat Raqqah, Shirawan Mazin and Hayr inside Iraqi territory.

6. On 23 July 1996, Turkish military forces comprising two regiments of storm troopers entered and searched the regions of Shirawan Mazin and Hayr. When they withdrew on 24 July 1996, 15 people from the area had been killed and 20 others injured.

7. On 25 July 1996, Turkish artillery bombarded the region of Nawdasht inside Iraqi territory, causing the death of two persons from the area and injuring eight others.

8. On 28 July 1996, Turkish combat aircraft bombarded the refugee camp in Atrush and several villages in northern Iraq.

9. On 8 August 1996, Turkish artillery bombarded the environs of Mizwari in the subdistrict of Mirga Sur inside Iraqi territory. The bombardment lasted several hours.

10. On 11 August 1996, Turkish combat aircraft bombarded the village of Hawrah inside Iraqi territory, causing the death of nine persons, four of whom were women.

In transmitting to you the details of the Turkish violations given above, the Government of Iraq requests the holding of an immediate and exhaustive investigation into the above-mentioned events, since the repeated bombardments of Iraqi towns and villages by Turkish forces, and their incursions into Iraqi territory, are a blatant violation of Iraq's sovereignty and of the integrity of its territory and airspace.

The Government of Iraq has warned its neighbour Turkey on many previous occasions of the consequences of perpetuating the irregular situation in northern Iraq. The continued stationing of the forces of the so-called "Operation Poised Hammer" on Turkish territory on various pretexts is merely intended to conceal aggressive operations against the Republic of Iraq and intervention in its internal affairs.

While reserving its right to seek compensation for the damage resulting from these Turkish violations and incursions into Iraqi territory and airspace, the Government of the Republic of Iraq renews its appeal to the Government of Turkey to reconsider its policies regarding the situation in northern Iraq and to initiate cooperation between the two neighbouring countries, guided by the principle of good neighbourliness and mutual respect for sovereignty.

The Republic of Iraq urges the United Nations to shoulder the responsibilities delegated to it under the Charter of the United Nations and to prevent any repetition of the threats and hostilities to which my country is continually exposed.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq